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This paper uses a new cross-section survey data-set of 6,000 firms in 26 transition 
economies conducted in 2002 to investigate how market infrastructure and product 
market competition affect innovative activity and growth. Questions were asked about 
organizational change, innovative activity, the state of competition faced by the firm and 
the firm’s evaluation of its external environment. The external environment or market 
infrastructure refers to the state of transport and communications, the framework of laws 
and regulations, and the effectiveness of the financial system in matching investment 
resources with entrepreneurial opportunities. Our aim is to see whether there is evidence 
that the market infrastructure directly affects innovation and performance and / or 
whether it works in conjunction with competitive pressure. We find some indication that 
factors internal to the firm, the firm’s relationships with its competitors, and the market 
infrastructure play distinctive roles in innovation decisions and in firm growth. 
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This paper investigates the role played by competition and the external environment in 
which firms operate for their innovative activity and growth. Transition economies 
provide a valuable opportunity for trying to identify the importance of these factors since 
a large number of countries switched from a planned to a market economy regime early 
in the 1990s and present a wide variety of experience in the successful establishment of 
the different components of the market infrastructure.  
 
We distinguish between three aspects of the market infrastructure: physical, legal and 
financial. Schumpeter placed particular emphasis on the importance of financial 
institutions for the process of creative destruction; Adam Smith linked both physical 
infrastructure and the structure of laws to the effective operation of the competitive 
process. The following quote from The Wealth of Nations captures the direct role of 
infrastructure for growth as well as its importance for the operation of competition that 
we seek to explore: 
Good roads, canals and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, 
put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those in the 
neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all 
improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always 
be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advantageous to the town, by 
breaking down the monopoly of the country in its neighbourhood. They are 
advantageous even to that part of the country. Though they introduce some rival 
commodities into the old market, they open many new markets to its product. 
Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management, which can never be 
universally established but in consequence of that free and universal competition 
which forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence. 
(The Wealth of Nations 1776, Pelican edition 1970, p. 251) 
 
There is a disparate empirical literature that attempts to characterize the role played by 
infrastructure in economic performance. At one extreme is the cross-country growth 
regression tradition where physical, legal or financial infrastructure variables are added to 
standard (augmented) Solow-type regressions. At the other are micro-data based studies, 
usually of individual countries. The empirical literature is plagued by the problems of 
how to measure these variables and how to deal with reverse causation and omitted 
variables. Most of the literature focuses on the direct effect on performance of 
infrastructure at the national level so as to capture external, network and threshold effects.  
 
Probably the most successful attempt to test for the direct effect of physical infrastructure 
on growth using country level data is Roeller & Waverman (2001). They identify the 
problems with previous work: for example, Aschauer (1989) reported very high growth 
returns from investment in physical infrastructure but did not deal adequately either with 
the fact that growth drives up the demand for infrastructure (reverse causality) or with the 
omission from the analysis of other policies or institutions that are potentially correlated 
with infrastructure provision. Roeller and Waverman focus on telecommunications 
infrastructure in a sample of OECD countries and address the first problem by estimating 
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a production function for GDP simultaneously with equations for the demand for (the 
stock) of infrastructure and the supply (flow) of infrastructure investment. The second 
problem is handled by estimating the equations with country fixed effects. They find a 
positive effect of telecommunications infrastructure investment (the size of which is 
much reduced (by over one-third) when controlling for country fixed effects). Even so, 
their estimates suggest that about one-third of the growth of the OECD economies over 
the period from 1970 to 1990 is attributable to the extension of telecommunications 
infrastructure.  
 
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) use cross country data on 78 developing and OECD 
countries over the period 1965-95 to examine the importance of telecom and power 
infrastructure to growth. The approach has some similarity with that of Roeller and 
Waverman in the sense that they estimate a system in which they also have an equation 
for investment in infrastructure (i.e. supply). The specific question they address is 
whether the contribution of physical infrastructure to growth depends on other 
institutional characteristics of the economy. They use measures of institutional quality 
such as democracy, contract enforcement and interactions with measures of ethnic and 
income heterogeneity. They find that institutional quality affects both the steady state 
level of investment in infrastructure as well as the speed of adjustment. The paper 
represents an attempt to pin down the circumstances under which infrastructure 
investment occurs as well as how it affects growth from the ‘supply of infrastructure’ side. 
They do not investigate how institutional quality may mediate the impact of the 
infrastructure stock on growth.  
 
A quite different literature is that of ‘firm ecology’, which examines the determinants of 
the size distribution of firms. A key finding of this literature is the phenomenon of the 
‘missing middle’ in the size distribution of firms in developing countries – i.e. the failure 
of small firms to grow. In a wide-ranging survey of the literature, Tybout (2000) 
concludes that high transactions and information costs associated with weak institutions 
prevent the size distribution from evolving toward that of developed economies. A recent 
paper that seeks to test for the mechanisms at work is Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002), 
who use firm-level data from the Ivory Coast. They find that the obstacles to firm growth 
due to failings in physical infrastructure, financial infrastructure and business regulation 
as reported in surveys of managers vary systematically with size (with both micro (<5 
employees) and large (>250) least constrained). They interpret this as supportive of the 
hypothesis that inadequate physical and financial infrastructure impair the growth of 
small firms. 
 
Evidence on the impact of legal infrastructure on performance is more limited. A striking 
characteristic of the transition has been the extent to which the law on the books has been 
reformed to embody high levels of protection for creditors and shareholders – often 
higher than found in many advanced economies. Early cross-country work by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (using a sample of developed and 
developing but not transition countries) suggested that the nature of the law on the books 
was more important for financial development than was the rule of law. The experience 
of the transition economies points the opposite way. Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) 
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have shown that across transition countries, financial development measured either by the 
size of the stock market or of private credit relative to GDP is better correlated with the 
rule of law than with features of the law of the books (such as the extent of creditor or 
minority shareholder protection). Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003) develop this 
argument further, showing that transplantation of legal codes from abroad produces 
weaker legal institutions than does the internal development or adaptation of legal codes 
to local conditions. 
 
Levine (2003) surveys the empirical literature testing for the role of financial 
development in growth and argues that there is now causal evidence from country, 
industry and firm-level studies. The literature on transition has documented the existence 
of weak financial infrastructure in the form of credit constraints on new firms combined 
with the availability of finance to poorly performing old firms (e.g., Lizal and Svejnar 
2002).  
 
Brown and Earle (2001) provide empirical evidence on the role of competition and 
infrastructure in the performance of Russian firms. They refer to Aghion and 
Schankerman (1998, 2003) as providing the theoretical starting point. Aghion and 
Schankerman develop a model of infrastructure and competition in which a reduction in 
transport costs enhances product market competition by increasing the elasticity of 
substitution between differentiated goods. The enhanced competition then affects 
productivity through both selection and incentive effects for incumbents. Brown and 
Earle test for the interaction between infrastructure and competition amongst incumbent 
firms using firm-level data for medium to large firms (>100 employees) in Russian 
manufacturing industry over the period 1992-99 to explore the interaction between 
competition and infrastructure. They estimate a production function augmented by 
market structure (an inverse measure of market concentration calculated at industry level 
pre-reform), infrastructure (telecommunications and transport) and market structure 
interacted with infrastructure. They include two policy/political variables (measuring the 
extent of price regulation in the region and the proportion of communist votes in the 
regional elections) and interact them with the competition measure. Although the choice 
of a market structure variable from the pre-reform period avoids a potential endogeneity 
problem, it is unclear how well it represents the competitive conditions faced by firms in 
the sample. They find some evidence for the presence of a positive interaction effect 
between better physical infrastructure and product market competition as a determinant 
of static efficiency.  
 
The present study offers a contribution by making use of data that combines a broad 
variety of country experience across transition with firm-level information on 
performance and actions taken by the firm as well as on a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators of each dimension of the market infrastructure. This allows us to 
test whether infrastructure has a direct impact on firm performance and/or an indirect one 
via its interaction with the extent of product market competition or innovation. We also  
follow up in a systematic way an observation that emerged from an analysis of a previous 
large-scale firm-level survey (BEEPS99) (Carlin, Haskel, Seabright 2001). Major 
organizational change was reported by 9.5% of firms in that sample and such 
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organizational change appeared to be differentially associated with sales and productivity 
growth in the non-CIS as compared with the CIS countries. This was interpreted as 
suggesting that the quality of the market infrastructure is important in translating 
restructuring effort (as measured by organizational change) into performance 
improvements.  
 
In section 2, we explain the nature of the data and the variables that we use. In section 3, 
we present descriptive results on performance and then explore the determinants of sales 
growth and innovation. Section 4 provides an interpretation of our results and suggests 
the direction to be taken by further research.  
 
2. Data description and definition of variables  
The data used in this paper comes from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (referred to from here as BEEPS02) conducted in the 
summer of 2002. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews in 26 
transition countries (plus Turkey) and covered 6,667 firms. An earlier large-scale firm-
level survey was conducted in 1999 (BEEPS99). The results of the earlier survey have 
been presented in several papers (e.g. Hellman and Schankerman, 2000, Carlin, Fries, 
Schaffer and Seabright, 2001).  
 
A detailed description of the survey and overview of results is provided in Fries and 
Polanec (2003) and in a report by the company that conducted the survey (MEMRB 
2002). The sample was designed to be representative of the non-farm business sector of 
the economy (excluding sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential 
supervision: railways, water supply, electricity generation and banking). The target shares 
of firms from industry and services in each country were dictated by the sectoral shares 
of GDP. Within each broad sector, the aim was to achieve a representative sample of 
firms subject to fulfilling a set of quotas to ensure the presence of firms with specific 
characteristics. Minimum quotas were imposed as follows: by size group (10% small (2-
49 employees), 10% medium (50-249), 10% large (250-9,999)), by ownership (10% 
foreign-owned and10% state-owned), a minimum of 10% of exporting firms, and by 
location (10% of firms to be located in a town with a population of less than 50,000 or in 
a rural area). Only enterprises in existence from 1999 were included since performance 
data requested was for the three years up to 2002.  
 
Populations of firms eligible were obtained from the Statistical Office (supplemented by 
other sources) and firms were classified according to the specified characteristics. The 
characteristics of the self-weighted samples were then compared with the minimum quota 
requirements. To the extent the quotas were not met, re-weighting was required. 
Judgemental considerations entered only at the final stage in relation to the selection of 
sample firms in the service sector. It was frequently the case that 60-80% of enterprises in 
the service sector were in ‘retail, wholesale and repairs’ and that this population of firms 
was close to the universe of small private firms. In order to ensure that other parts of the 
service sector (transportation, hotels, real estate etc.) were included in the survey, and to 
increase the chances of meeting the size and ownership criteria, the share of firms from 
these sectors was increased. 
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More firms were sampled than the target in order to fulfil the quotas for ownership and 
exporting firms. One country was dropped (Turkmenistan) because of intervention by the 
secret police. In all, 18,052 firms were contacted and 6,667 interviews completed (37%). 
Approximately the same number of firms refused to participate, with the remainder 
accounted for by firms contacted in order to fulfil the quotas but which turned out to be 
ineligible.  
 
Table 1 summarizes the size and ownership characteristics of the sample. Around a third 
of firms are very small (fewer than 10 employees), and another third have less than 50 
employees. In terms of ownership, 63% are new firms with no state-owned predecessor 
and among old firms, the privatized and state-owned categories comprise 23% and 14% 
respectively. As compared with BEEPS99, the share of small firms is higher (up from 
50%) and so is the share of new firms (up from 54%). These differences reflect the 
rapidly changing structure of the economies, as does a somewhat greater representation 
of service sector firms (which here comprise some 62% of the sample).  
  
[Table 1 here] 
 
In this paper we use as measures of firm performance their (self-reported) growth of sales 
and of labour productivity during the three years prior to the survey. In addition, we have 
sought to uncover the steps undertaken by firms to improve their performance. Firms 
were asked questions about whether they had developed a new product line or upgraded 
an existing one, whether they had opened a new plant, whether they had obtained 
ISO9000 quality accreditation in the previous three years, and whether they had 
introduced new technology that had substantially changed the way that the main product 
is produced. 
 
The innovation variable used in our estimations is constructed using the method of 
principal components from responses to the questions described above.1  The index is 
normalized so that the minimum value is zero and the maximum value is the number of 
possible restructuring measures.  This is done to facilitate interpretation of the regression 
results – a unit increase in the index corresponds, roughly speaking, to the introduction of 
another restructuring measure. 
 
A separate question was asked about the extent to which firms had engaged in 
reorganization since 1998: responses were coded according to four possible degrees of 
reorganization from “My firm is organized in much the same way as it was in 1998” to 
“My firm has had a completely new organizational structure”. Across the sample 12% of 
firms reported undertaking a complete organizational change. 
 
                                                 
1
 The use of a summary measures is more conservative than the alternative of including all the individual 
components as explanatory variables in the regressions.  With so many regressors, a likely outcome of this 
alternative procedure is a finding that some regressors are significant and with the expected sign, some are 
insignificant, and some are significant but with the opposite of the expected sign, making it difficult to 
reach an overall interpretation of the results. 
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The survey instrument was expressly designed to discover the extent to which firms 
believed themselves to be facing significant competitive challenge. It began by asking 
firms three questions designed to elicit different indicators of the extent of competition in 
the market for the firm’s main product: 
 
• The first question elicited information about the number of competitors the firm 
believed itself to face in this market, distinguishing in the replies between no 
competitors, one to three competitors, and more than three competitors. Note that 
although this looks like a simple market concentration measure, it measures 
concentration in what the firm believes to be its main market, rather than the 
administrative category of products the firm is placed in by the national statistical 
agency.  
• The second question concerned what firms believed to be the likely reaction of 
customers to a real 10% rise in the price of its main product, its competitors’ 
prices remaining unchanged in real terms. This represented an attempt to ascertain 
directly the firm’s perceived own-price elasticity of demand. Four categories of 
response were allowed, representing progressively less elastic responses of overall 
demand.  
• The third question asked for an estimate of the mark-up of prices over variable 
costs (a method of ascertaining directly the Lerner index of market power). 
 
In fact the responses to these three questions complement one another. Carlin & 
Seabright (2001) show, using the equivalent data from BEEPS99, that firms in 
concentrated markets report lower own-price elasticities, and profit from these elasticities 
to raise their margins, which is an entirely intuitive relationship.  
 
Table 2 confirms this finding with the data from BEEPS02. It shows that firms reporting 
no competitors in the market for their main product report on average a lower impact on 
sales of a hypothetical price rise, and that firms reporting such a lower impact report 
higher average price-cost margins. This indicates a degree of consistency across the 
complementary measures of competition in this sample of firms.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The survey also sought to investigate the impact of perceived competitive pressure on 
decisions by managers to undertake restructuring measures. The responses on sources of 
pressure to innovate are important since they enable us to explore more closely how 
performance improvements come about. Specifically, firms were asked about the 
importance of certain factors, including pressure from various kinds of competitors and 
from customers, in influencing their decision to undertake restructuring.  
 
Finally, BEEPS02 asked a range of questions about the availability and quality of 
infrastructure, classified under three main headings: physical infrastructure (power, water 
and telecommunications), legal infrastructure (the reliability and accessibility of the 
courts; barriers to business activity due to poor law enforcement) and financial 
infrastructure (availability of credit). We used principal components analysis to obtain an 
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aggregate measure of infrastructure quality in each of these three domains. We began by 
defining the infrastructure variables using as much information as was available in the 
survey – i.e. based on the full range of questions asked. This produced infrastructure 
measures reflecting both quantitative and qualitative components (e.g. ‘days without 
power supply’ and ‘judgement of how serious was electricity as an obstacle for the 
operation and growth of the business’). However, we faced a trade-off between the use of 
very broadly based measures and a diminution in the size of the sample. Firms were 
especially reluctant to answer questions about ‘unofficial payments’ that had to be made 
for example in order to get connected to services or to deal with the courts, and to answer 
questions about financing (MEMRB 2002). In the end, we decided to use measures based 
on less than the maximum number of components: by dropping the components with the 
smallest eigenvectors in the construction of the principal components, the sample size 
was increased. Our experiments suggest that the qualitative results are not affected by this 
choice. The components of each infrastructure variable are shown in the appendix. 
 
To summarize, the physical infrastructure variable reflects interruptions to supply, delays 
in obtaining connection and problems with electricity as a barrier to business. The legal 
infrastructure measure reflects the evaluation of the operation of the judiciary, the 
presence of corruption, crime and the mafia as a barrier to business. The financial 
infrastructure measure reflects the significance of access to finance and its cost as a 
barrier to business. The ‘barriers to operating and expanding your business’ question 
allows us to establish how firms rank the three elements of the market infrastructure that 
we are interested in. The physical infrastructure factors (telecommunications, electricity, 
transport) are ranked as least problematic (mean scores from 3.4 to 3.5 on a scale of 1 
‘Major obstacle’ to 4 ‘No obstacle’); followed by legal infrastructure (2.8 to 3.2) and as 
most problematic, financial infrastructure (2.5, 2.7). 
 
The country means for the infrastructure measures used in the analysis below are 
presented in Table 3 and produce some surprising results. The rankings for physical 
infrastructure accord with perceptions of progress in transition and GDP per capita: four 
accession countries (Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and Croatia 
make up the top five whilst Tajikistan, Albania, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan are at the bottom. On legal infrastructure, however, the top five include 
Hungary and Slovenia but also Azerbaijan, Armenia and Uzbekistan. The three Baltic 
states plus Slovenia top the rankings for financial infrastructure – but Kazakhstan is at 
number five. Poland is in the bottom five in both legal and financial infrastructure. Other 
survey results including those from BEEPS99 have produced apparently anomalous 
results, especially in relation to the countries at very early stages of transition. This can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that in a very underdeveloped market environment, 
‘market infrastructure’ is judged to be of limited importance to the operation of the firm. 
More worrying from the perspective of using these indicators is the apparent influence of 
the poor cyclical conditions in Poland (and to some extent in Bulgaria) on the measures 




Tables 4 and 5 give some descriptive results. Table 4 shows growth rates of sales, labour 
productivity and employment over the three years prior to the survey. Particularly 
noteworthy are the findings that countries with poor performances in the early survey 
BEEPS99 (notably Russia, Ukraine and countries in the CIS) have strong growth rates of 
sales in the present survey, while some former star performers (notably in central Europe) 
here perform much less well. Countries are grouped in Table 4 into the 8 early accession 
countries, the countries of South Eastern Europe (7) and the eleven CIS countries. 
Amongst the accession countries, firm performance in Poland stands out: on average, 
firms report falling sales over the past three years. This is also true of Bulgaria in SEE, 
with Macedonian firms on average reporting flat sales. Amongst the CIS countries, 
countries divide into two groups: those with growth of more than 20% and those with 
declining or stagnant sales (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.)  Of note 
also is the strong employment growth virtually everywhere (with the exception of Poland, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan), which makes the average figures for labour 
productivity growth much less impressive. However, nothing is implied about the welfare 
implications of these figures – low productivity growth may simply indicate that firm 
growth has been employment-intensive, which may well be a good thing in a region with 
high rates of both official and disguised unemployment.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 indicates that labour productivity growth has been exactly zero on average for the 
firms in the sample as a whole, with positive productivity growth in privatized and state 
firms but negative productivity growth (again interpreted as employment-intensive output 
growth) in new firms, which make up well over half the sample. This last feature was 
also strongly characteristic of firms in the earlier survey. In terms of overall sales growth, 
privatized firms have behaved more like new firms than like state-owned firms, in 
contrast to the earlier survey. Across the entire sample, average sales growth is much 
higher than recorded in the BEEPS99 survey (11.5% as compared with 2.6%). As in 1999 
growth is much higher amongst new than old firms but in the 2002 survey, strong sales 
growth is also reported by privatized firms). Table 3 also reports a measure of capital 
investment (the self-reported answer to the question of the percentage increase in fixed 
assets over the previous three years), which again indicates a broad similarity between 
privatized and new firms. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
We now turn to an examination of the main determinants of firm performance. Our 
approach is Schumpeterian in spirit: we focus on the role of the competitive environment  
and market infrastructure in explaining innovation behaviour by firms – both product and 
process innovations. We also explore the extent to which these factors can account for 
TFP growth, controlling for innovation. Innovation will typically entail the adjustment of 
factors of production, and the external environment of the firm may influence how 
reliably these actions are translated into success in terms of the growth of the firm.  
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More specifically, we make use of the empirical strategy developed to analyze the 
BEEPS99 data and described in CSS (2003). The objective is to estimate two equations – 
one for the firm’s innovation behaviour and the second for performance (controlling for 
innovation). The latter is measured by an augmented TFP-type growth equation in which 
we include the growth of employment and capital stock and measures of competition and 
infrastructure. We follow Nickell (1996) in using the cross-section to attempt to identify 
the role of the level of competition (and infrastructure) in TFP growth; unlike Nickell, we 
do not have a time series for our measures of competition and infrastructure and cannot 
therefore examine the effect of competition and infrastructure on the level of TFP (by 
including a term in the change in competition in the TFP growth equation).  
 
To ensure identification of the two equations, we exclude from the growth equation firm 
size and measures of the pressure to innovate. Firm size is a standard determinant of 
innovation (e.g. in R&D expenditure equations) whereas there is no strong prior that it 
has an independent direct effect on growth. Sales growth is excluded from the innovation 
equation; instead we make use of a more specific measure of the pressure of demand by 
using the responses of managers to a question asking them to rate the importance of 
pressure from customers as a factor behind their decision to undertake innovation. 
 
The variables of interest in this paper are those related to competition and infrastructure 
described above. Reverse causality is a worry in relation to both. It is indeed possible that 
firms recording high growth in the recent past (or having undertaken innovation) tend to 
perceive a systematically different elasticity of product demand or a different number of 
competitors than do poorly performing firms. Similarly, such firms may have a rosier 
outlook, which leads them to express more confidence in the infrastructure. Conversely, 
successful firms may be more sensitive to their external environment and therefore more 
critical about it than mediocre firms. Unfortunately our data does not provide a means for 
controlling for reverse causality. We therefore stress that data of the kind we report can 
make a contribution by helping to identify channels through which competition and 
infrastructure may be having their effect: it should be seen as complementary to evidence 
that is more informative about causality but less informative about channels.  
 
Table 6 reports the result of an OLS regression of sales growth. The key findings are as 
follows: our measure of physical infrastructure is insignificant but our measures of 
financial and legal infrastructure are strongly (and positively) associated with sales 
growth. New product restructuring is highly significant. Our competition variables matter 
only to the extent that firms reporting the highest own-price demand elasticities have 
grown more slowly than others, indicating that some degree of market power is important 
in growth. However (and in striking contrast to the findings of the earlier survey), the 
number of reported competitors is insignificant2. The differences between new and old 
                                                 
2
 This may be an indication that market structure has become more endogenous than it was in the earlier 
survey, in that opportunities for growth (previously characteristic of markets with somewhat restricted 
competition) may have attracted increased entry and therefore intensified competition. It may also reflect 
the coarseness of the grid used to sort firms by perceived rivalry: in BEEPS99, firms were distributed 
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firms, and among old firms between state-owned and privatized firms, are insignificant 
and remain so in all specifications of the sales regressions we have tried, including those 
reported below. Finally, both the employment growth and capital investment variables 
are highly significant as one would expect given the production function specification. 
However, in interpreting these elasticities we should note that the short time period of 
observation implies that their magnitude would be likely to deviate substantially from 
those estimated for a long-run production function observed in equilibrium.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
As in CSS (2003) we take seriously the endogeneity of innovation, which may well be 
the consequence as well as the cause of sales growth (and for which we cannot control 
through panel data techniques since this is a cross-section).3 Moves by the firm to 
develop or modify products or to introduce new technology may be the result of poor past 
performance or they may be spurred by good performance. Table 7 reports an OLS 
equation in which our measure of innovation is regressed on the measures of competition 
and on firms’ reports of “pressure to innovate” from domestic competitors, foreign 
competitors and customers, as well as on a range of controls. Although the number of 
competitors is again insignificant, the results confirm that competition matters 
importantly, and in a similar manner to that reported in CFSS(2001) and CSS (2003) for 
the earlier survey. That is, market power (as determined by the 10% test) is an important 
determinant (positively) of innovation. However, firms’ perceptions of the need to 
innovate because of competitive pressure is also important. The overall message is highly 
Schumpeterian in spirit. Size is also a significant positive determinant of innovation, new 
firms innovate more and state firms less than privatized ones, and innovation is higher in 
industry as compared with services. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
Drawing on these insights we use instrumental variables to estimate the sales growth 
equation and report the results in Table 84. The key finding is that innovation as a 
determinant of sales growth becomes much more important; its already highly significant 
coefficient quadrupling in size. This is consistent with the hypothesis that poor 
performance is a spur to innovation, leading to a downward bias on the innovation 
variable in the absence of instrumenting. The market power variables lose all significance, 
indicating that they work entirely through their impact on innovation. The coefficients on 
the two significant infrastructure variables somewhat increase.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
across the three categories of zero, 1-3, >3 competitors as follows: 9.0; 13.1; 77.8. In BEEPS02, the 
distribution is 1.3; 16.8; 81.9. 
3
 It is important to note that even if we had been able to collect a second round of data from the set of firms 
surveyed in BEEPS99, it is unlikely that panel data techniques would be admissable. Given the nature of 
the sample selection and the extent of structural change in these economies over this period, attrition bias 
would be a serious concern. 
4
 We exclude pressure from domestic competitors as an instrument because of its likely endogeneity, and 
indeed a C-test rejects its exogeneity at 10%; without it, the remaining instrument set comfortably passes 
the Hansen test.  
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[Table 8 here] 
 
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that both financial and legal infrastructure have 
a significant positive impact on firm performance, though (perhaps surprisingly) physical 
infrastructure does not. To draw a firm conclusion about the role of physical 
infrastructure from this data would probably be unwise. In the documentation provided 
by the survey company, it is very clear that poor telecommunications infrastructure was a 
major hindrance in conducting the survey. The survey design required firms to be 
identified from statistical office registers (supplemented by commercial directories) and 
contacted by telephone to conduct the screener questionnaire and arrange the full 
interview. The free-form country reports for Albania, Armenia, Georgia and Uzbekistan 
all mention that the low penetration and poor telephone lines in rural and sometimes 
urban areas made identification of firms difficult. Firms in the sample are biased toward 
those with access to telecommunications infrastructure and this makes it less likely that a 
variable measuring infrastructure at the level of the firm will show up as a significant 
determinant of performance.  
 
Can we say more about how precisely infrastructure affects firm performance? One 
striking finding of the earlier survey (reported in Carlin, Haskel and Seabright, 2001) was 
that organizational change was a much more hazardous activity in countries of the CIS 
than elsewhere. CIS firms reporting high levels of reorganization were not more likely to 
have performed better than those adopting a more cautious strategy, whereas outside the 
CIS, major organizational change was a highly significant predictor of good performance. 
This led us to conjecture that perhaps the better infrastructure of non-CIS countries might 
be interacting with organizational change to increase its effectiveness. Table 9 shows this 
comparison for both sales and productivity growth for each of the two surveys. The 
disparity between the two regions is absent in the more recent survey. In fact only a 
couple of countries (Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan) display the pattern characteristic of 
the CIS in the BEEPS99 survey. The extent of organizational change is indeed strongly 
associated with sales growth (though not with productivity growth, which tends to 
reinforce the impression that the current phase of transition is more about 
‘disequilibrium’ labour-intensive growth than about labour-shedding). However, the 
strength of the association is if anything stronger in the CIS than elsewhere. This 
suggests that if the state of infrastructure is indeed responsible for the greater 
effectiveness of organizational change, the disadvantage of the CIS in this respect has 
disappeared (or perhaps been offset by other factors). 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
So how does organizational change affect innovation and sales growth, and does it 
interact with infrastructure? In the absence of clear guidance from economic theory, we 
proceed in an empirical fashion. We have estimated, but do not report, an OLS sales 
growth equation with the extent of organizational change as a regressor, both alone and 
interacted with the infrastructure variables. In the former specification it is highly 
significant (though multi-collinearity problems make both it and the interaction terms 
 13 
insignificant in the latter); however, its significance disappears once the endogeneity of 
innovation is taken into account in the IV estimation. This suggests that it is worth 
investigating directly the relationship of organizational change to innovation. Table 10 
does just that. It reports an extended specification of the innovation equation, with both 
the extent of organizational change and the infrastructure variables included as regressors. 
Organizational change is massively significant and positive, and the two infrastructure 
variables that were significant in the sales regressions are insignificant here. This means 
that the effect of legal and financial infrastructure on productivity does not come via 
inducing innovation. Somewhat surprisingly, physical infrastructure enters significantly 
but with a negative sign, a result for which we have no convincing explanation.  
  
[Table 10 here] 
 
Table 11 reports the new instrumental variables estimation of sales growth with 
organizational change included as a first-stage regressor only. Compared to the results 
reported in Table 8, the main effect is to lower somewhat the coefficient on innovation, 
but importantly to lower its standard error by about one third. The instruments (including 
organizational change) pass the conventional tests for instrumental validity, though as 
these are not particularly powerful tests this does not amount to a positive endorsement of 
their quality as instruments. However, this does raise the question of how to interpret the 
findings. 
 
[Table 11 here] 
 
There would seem to be two main alternative interpretations. One is that organizational 
change is just a form of innovation that our innovation variable fails to capture 
adequately but which, when present, is strongly associated with improved firm 
performance. If so our first-stage regression in the IV sales growth estimation would be 
mis-specified, since organizational change would be correlated with the error term in the 
first stage (innovation) equation (rather than in the second stage, which is what the tests 
measure). While we cannot rule this possibility out, if it were valid we would expect 
organizational change to show up as independently significant in the second stage 
equation, which it does not (Table 11 does not report this but the addition of 
organizational change to the regressors produces an insignificant parameter estimate). 
 
A second interpretation, which we are inclined to favour, is that willingness to undertake 
major organizational change is a product of a formative change in the culture, 
management and (in a general sense) the politics of the firm – an internal managerial 
revolution. This change is the result of human factors internal to the firm and need not be 
associated particularly with the presence of market opportunities (in this sense it is 
exogenous to both innovation and to sales growth). However, when it occurs it both tends 
to encourage innovation and to ensure that, when innovation occurs, it is translated more 
reliably into improved performance. By itself it is not the solution to the firm’s 
difficulties (change for change’s sake may be merely turbulent), but when it leads to 
innovation it may be a powerful factor in improved performance. This would explain why 
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our results show organizational change to be very significant in explaining innovation but 
to be of insignificant weight as an independent factor in sales growth. 
 
These results suggest that in economies in which the operation of market forces is of 
recent origin, radical organizational change and innovation are widespread phenomena 
and are positively associated with labour-intensive growth of the firm. This data provides 
the opportunity of taking a first step toward disentangling the factors behind this 
phenomenon. What role is played by the components of the market infrastructure 
(physical, legal, financial) and by the extent of product market competition? We divide 
the underlying determinants into factors internal to the firm (characteristics of managers 
(and workers)); the competitive environment in which the firm operates (the firm and its 
rivals) and the market infrastructure (external to the firm). Our investigation using this 
data-set suggests that it may be internal factors that determine which firms undertake 
radical organizational change. Willingness to embark on major organizational change in 
turn feeds into the innovation decision, at which stage the competitive environment both 
in terms of the pressure from competitors and the expected rents from innovation/ rents to 
finance innovation come into play. Finally, over and above the role played by innovation 
in growth, a favourable legal and financial infrastructure boosts growth further.  
 
Our speculations about the role of an internal managerial revolution remain very 
obviously speculations since it is hard to find measurable empirical correlates of such a 
phenomenon. It might be, for instance, that such a revolution comes about only when a 
firm’s general manager is replaced (this would be an extreme version of the theory that 
differences between good and bad managers are more important than the incentives 
facing any particular manager). Table 12 examines whether the replacement of a general 
manager is related to innovation – but finds this variable to be significantly negative. 
However, there are some likely alternative explanations for this, such as that a general 
manager might be replaced precisely because the firm has been resistant to innovation 
and has been performing poorly.  
 
For the time being therefore we merely note these issues as providing an ambitious 






One of the clearest messages to come out of this survey is that firms in Russia and the 
CIS have performed very much better than in the earlier survey, both in absolute terms 
and in comparison to firms in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. This is 
true not only in that their levels of sales growth are better (something that should come as 
no surprise given the improved macroeconomic performance of the region, at least 
compared to its dismal performance in the late 1990s). More significantly perhaps, the 
current survey appears to indicate that CIS firms are behaving more like “normal” firms, 
or at least like their counterparts elsewhere in the transition. For those counterparts 
elsewhere, successful change was not just about labour-shedding but about finding new 
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markets and new opportunities. For those counterparts elsewhere, innovation and 
organizational change might be hazardous but they had a clear tendency to be associated 
with improved performance. In the CIS, in contrast, conditions appeared so turbulent that 
firms engaging in innovation and organizational change had little hope of doing much 
better than firms that merely drew in their horns and waited for the storm to pass. The 
storm did pass for significant numbers of them, but without particular rewards for those 
who had been bold compared to those who had been timid. That has now changed, and in 
the CIS as elsewhere fortune favours the brave – at least in expectation. Willingness to 
innovate remains the most reliable single indicator of improved performance throughout 
the region. 
 
What has caused this change? We previously speculated that the presence of satisfactory 
physical, legal and financial infrastructure might be the key factor making the difference 
between firms that successfully innovate and those that do not, and that this might 
explain why organizational change had seemed so much more turbulent in the CIS than 
elsewhere. Two things make us sceptical about this now. The first is the disappearance of 
the disadvantage apparently faced by CIS firms: three years seems too short a time for a 
radical catch-up by the region of prior infrastructural shortcomings. The second is that 
our infrastructural variables show up in our performance equations either as insignificant 
or wrongly signed (physical infrastructure) or as significant only directly and not in 
interaction with organizational change, innovation or competition. Our tests for 
interaction are, of course, only weak ones, and our legal and financial infrastructure 
variables are based on subjective responses to a survey, but we can at least say that we 
have not found positive evidence for the “infrastructure as a condition for successful 
innovation” hypothesis.  
 
However, we have found very clear evidence that organizational change is both a 
statistical predictor of innovation and is associated with more reliable outcomes of 
innovation. This suggests a more “cultural” and less infrastructural explanation of why 
CIS firms have found innovation more reliably rewarded by results in the more recent 
period. For reasons that may have to do with political factors at the country level, it may 
be that firms in the CIS have taken much longer to accept the inevitability of radical 
organizational reform, and longer to accept that they must look after themselves rather 
than depend on a client relationship with the state. It may also be that such acceptance 
has some aspects of a coordination problem – if only some groups within a firm, or only 
some firms within a network of suppliers and customers, accept the necessity of 
organizational change, then those that do may be less sure of success (which may in turn 
discourage the others). If so the evidence suggests that CIS firms are starting to overcome 
the coordination problem. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) argued that in the initial stage of 
transition, increased competition would impair performance because of its effect in 
triggering the disintegration of supply chains. In a comparison between Bulgaria and 
Estonia, Konings (1998) demonstrated the role of disorganization in early as compared 
with late transition.  
 
The solution of coordination problems is also easier in a growing than in a contracting 
economy and the macroeconomic improvement in the region following the Russian crisis 
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may have played a part. Evidence from market economies suggests that the ‘creative 
destruction’ process works differently in booms and recessions (Carlin, Haskel and 
Seabright 2001). It seems that the adversity faced by firms in recessions does not have the 
same beneficial effect on incentives to restructure as does the threat from innovative 
rivals. This is consistent with the poor performance observed for Polish firms in this 
period. Needless to say this interpretation remains highly speculative, but we hope to 
pursue it further in later work. 
 
Finally, it is encouraging to note that high sales growth among the surveyed firms has 
been associated with strong employment growth, especially in a region where both open 
and hidden unemployment has remained very high. Nevertheless caution is required in 
interpreting the strong growth performance of firms in the CIS: growth spurts for 
countries lasting up to a decade are much more common than is success in sustained 
convergence (Rodrik 2003 Table 9). Growth has been sparked in a broad range of 
transition countries but translating this into convergence may well depend on 






Aghion, P. and M. Schankerman (1998). ‘Competition, entry and the social returns to 
infrastructure in transition economies’. Economics of Transition. 7(1) 79-101. 
 
Aghion, P. and M. Schankerman (2003). ‘On the welfare effects and political economy of 
competition-enhancing policies’ forthcoming Economic Journal 2004. 
 
Aschauer, D. (1989). ‘Is public expenditure productive?’ Journal of Monetary Economics 
23(2) 177-200. 
 
Berkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, (2003) ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect,’ European Economic Review, 47(1), 
February 2003, 165-195. 
 
Blanchard, O. and M. Kremer (1997). ‘Disorganisation’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112(4) 454-465. 
 
Brown, J. D. and J. Earle (2001). ‘Competition-enhancing policies and infrastructure: 
evidence from Russia’. Mimeo SITE. 
 
Carlin, W., J. Haskel and P. Seabright (2001). ‘Understanding the ‘essential fact about 
capitalism’: markets, competition and creative destruction’ National Institute Economic 
Review 175. 70-87. 
 
Carlin, W., S. Fries, M. Schaffer and P. Seabright (2001; revised 2003). ‘Competition and 
enterprise performance in transition: evidence from a cross-country survey’ CEPR 
Discussion Paper Series No. 2840. 
 
Carlin, W., M. Schaffer and P. Seabright (2003). Competition, rivalry and growth: 
evidence of an inverted-U relationship from a cross-country survey of firms in transition 
economies. Mimeo. 
 
Carlin, W. and P. Seabright (2001). ‘The importance of competition in developing 
countries for productivity and innovation’. Background Paper for World Development 
Report
 
Esfahani, H. S. and M. T. Ramirez (2003). ‘Institutions, infrastructure and economic 
growth’, Journal of Development Economics. 70. 443-477. 
 
Fries, S. and S. Polanec (2003). ‘EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey: Overview of the 2002 Results’. EBRD. 
 
Hellman, J. and M. Schankerman (2000). ‘Intervention, corruption and capture: the nexus 
between enterprises and the state’. Economics of Transition 8(3) 545-576. 
 
 18 
Konings, J. (1998). ‘Firm performance in Bulgaria and Estonia: the effects of competitive 
pressure, financial pressure and disorganization’ WDI Working Paper No. 185. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1998), “Law and finance”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
 
Lizal, L. and J. Svejnar (2002). ‘Investment, credit rationing and the soft budget 
constraint: evidence from the Czech Republic’ Review of Economics and Statistics 84(2) 
353-370. 
 
Levine, R. (2003). ‘Finance and Growth’ in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (ed) (forthcoming)  
Handbook of Economic Growth.  
 
MEMRB (2002). ‘The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey – 
2002: a brief report on observations, experiences and methodology from the survey’. 
MEMRB Custom Research Worldwide.  
 
Nickell, S. (1986). ‘Competition and corporate performance’ Journal of Political 
Economy. 104. 724-46. 
 
Pistor, K., M. Raiser and S. Gelfer (2000). ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’ 
Economics of Transition, 8(2) 325-368(44)  
 
Rodrik, Dani (2003). ‘Growth Strategies’ in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (ed) (forthcoming)  
Handbook of Economic Growth.  
 
Roeller, L.-H. and L. Waverman (2001). ‘Telecommunications infrastructure and 
economic development: a simultaneous approach’. American Economic Review 91(4) 
909-923. 
 
Sleuwaegen, L. and M. Goedhuys (2002). ‘Growth of firms in developing countries, 
evidence from Côte d’Ivoire’. Journal of Development Economics. 68 117-135. 
 
Tybout, J.R. (2000). ‘Manufacturing firms in developing countries: how well do they do 







Ownership and Size of Firms in Sample 
  
  
Number of Employees 
  
Ownership 2-9      10-49     50-199       200+ 
  
Total 
         
 Privatized 247        418        367        396  1428 
Row % 17.30      29.27      25.70      27.73  100.00 
Column % 11.86      20.30      35.63      41.64  23.33 
         
State 65        245        214        337  861 
Row % 7.55      28.46      24.85      39.14  100.00 
Column % 3.12      11.90      20.78      35.44  14.06 
         
New Firm 1770       1396        449        218  3833 
Row % 46.18      36.42      11.71       5.69  100.00 
Column % 85.01      67.80      43.59      22.92  62.61 
         
Total 2082       2059       1030        951  6122 
Row % 34.01      33.63      16.82      15.53  100.00 




Relation between three measures of perceived competition 
  Number of competitors in market for main product     
  
No 









(10% test):       
  1= Most sales 
would be lost 7 216 1663 1886 16.7% 
  2= Sales would 
fall a lot 9 143 934 1086 18.3% 
  3=Sales would 
fall slightly 17 370 1456 1843 20.0% 
  4=No change in 
sales 43 278 857 1178 20.9% 
Total 76 1007 4910 5993   
Average market 
power score 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.4   
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Table 3 
Country Means of Infrastructure Variables 
      
Country Physical Legal  Financial 
      
Albania 1.181           0.925           0.786 
Armenia 1.847           1.666           0.745 
Azerbaijan 1.632           1.726           0.855 
Belarus 1.831           1.384           0.653 
Bosnia-Herz 1.779           1.083           0.629 
Bulgaria 1.875           1.136           0.552 
Croatia 2.030           1.322           0.837 
Czech Rep 2.049           1.435           0.710 
Estonia 1.856           1.520           0.946 
FYR Macedonia 1.681           1.136           0.832 
Georgia 1.424           1.052           0.772 
Hungary 1.894           1.639           0.819 
Kazakhstan 1.700           1.510           0.923 
Kyrgyz Rep 1.532           1.254           0.803 
Latvia 1.960           1.564           0.984 
Lithuania 2.067           1.321           1.035 
Moldova 1.658           1.058           0.606 
Poland 2.045           1.097           0.515 
Romania 1.776           1.160           0.627 
Russia 1.691           1.426           0.819 
Slovakia 1.989           1.194           0.691 
Slovenia 1.995           1.626           0.943 
Tajikistan 0.774           1.389           0.635 
Ukraine 1.610           1.191           0.700 
Uzbekistan 1.619           1.606           0.747 







Mean log of growth over three years of: 
Country Sales Labour Productivity Employment 
      
Accession:     
      
Czech Rep 9.9% 2.4% 7.5% 
Estonia 22.3% 16.4% 6.6% 
Hungary 17.1% 12.6% 5.2% 
Latvia 9.6% -1.2% 11.5% 
Lithuania 6.7% -3.4% 9.6% 
Poland -4.8% -3.9% -0.7% 
Slovakia 15.6% 6.3% 10.8% 
Slovenia 14.7% -3.0% 16.5% 
      
South-East 
Europe:     
  
    
Albania 19.7% -25.7% 45.4% 
Bosnia-Herz 3.7% -7.8% 13.4% 
Bulgaria -6.7% -14.1% 7.4% 
Croatia 20.8% 5.1% 15.8% 
FYRMacedonia -0.2% -9.5% 10.0% 
Romania 20.4% 2.8% 16.8% 
Yugoslavia 8.1% -8.0% 18.1% 
      
CIS: 
    
      
Armenia -6.7% -19.1% 11.7% 
Azerbaijan 0.1% -10.8% 10.7% 
Belarus 18.3% 3.2% 14.6% 
Georgia -0.7% -11.6% 9.0% 
Kazakhstan 20.5% 2.2% 17.7% 
Kyrgyz Rep -1.8% 0.4% 0.5% 
Moldova 17.7% 0.1% 17.2% 
Russia 27.2% 7.2% 21.4% 
Tajikistan 2.0% -11.8% 15.5% 
Ukraine 20.0% 6.8% 13.3% 






    
Mean log of growth over three years of: 
  
Ownership 
Category Sales Labour Productivity Employment Fixed Capital 
       
Privatized 12.3% 10.8% 1.8% 10.0% 
State 5.9% 10.3% -4.4% 4.7% 
New Firm 12.5% -6.4% 19.1% 14.6% 
       




Determinants of Sales Growth 
OLS Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
P-
value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)    
      
Log employment growth 0.148 0.020 0.000 
Capital investment 0.531 0.032 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors -0.010 0.053 0.853 
   More than 3 competitors -0.056 0.052 0.283 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.040 0.019 0.033 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.037 0.016 0.025 
   No change in sales 0.044 0.018 0.014 
Innovation (principal component) 0.024 0.004 0.000 
Physical Infrastructure (principal 
component) -0.007 0.012 0.591 
Legal Infrastructure (principal component) 0.031 0.012 0.011 
Financial Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.033 0.014 0.023 
State-Owned Firm -0.005 0.021 0.799 
New Firm -0.019 0.016 0.224 
Industry 0.014 0.013 0.298 
Big City 0.021 0.014 0.132 
Country dummies YES    





Determinants of Innovation 
OLS Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)   
      
Log employment 0.208 0.015 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors -0.098 0.210 0.641 
   More than 3 competitors -0.353 0.207 0.089 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.117 0.059 0.046 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.389 0.053 0.000 
   No change in sales 0.424 0.062 0.000 
Pressure from Domestic Competitors 0.084 0.024 0.000 
Pressure from Foreign Competitors 0.164 0.021 0.000 
Pressure from Customers 0.115 0.024 0.000 
State-Owned Firm -0.243 0.073 0.001 
New firm 0.200 0.056 0.000 
Industry 0.564 0.045 0.000 
Big City 0.055 0.045 0.223 
Country dummies YES    






Determinants of Sales Growth 
GMM estimation Coefficient Robust Standard Error 
P-
value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)    
      
Log employment growth 0.131 0.019 0.000 
Capital investment 0.479 0.036 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors -0.017 0.055 0.753 
   More than 3 competitors -0.035 0.054 0.521 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.028 0.020 0.163 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.012 0.018 0.489 
   No change in sales 0.030 0.019 0.122 
Innovation (principal component) 0.098 0.018 0.000 
Physical Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.011 0.013 0.419 
Legal Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.043 0.013 0.001 
Financial Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.037 0.015 0.016 
New Firm -0.002 0.015 0.880 
Industry -0.039 0.019 0.039 
Big City 0.012 0.015 0.435 
Country dummies YES    
      
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions J-statistic = 2.5, p-value 0.28   
      




Sales and Productivity Growth by Firm 
Reorganization, 2 surveys 
  Extent of Reorganization: 
  None Some Major Complete 
       
Sales Growth     
       
Non-CIS      
BEEPS99 0.6% 11.2% 24.1% 27.0% 
BEEPS02 2.3% 12.7% 18.8% 18.3% 
       
CIS      
BEEPS99 -7.9% -1.1% -2.8% -0.6% 
BEEPS02 2.5% 17.5% 26.1% 19.4% 
       
Productivity Growth     
       
Non-CIS      
BEEPS99 0.0% 7.9% 12.2% 16.3% 
BEEPS02 -4.1% -0.8% 8.3% -6.7% 
       
CIS      
BEEPS99 -1.0% 0.7% 9.2% 1.4% 





Determinants of Innovation 
OLS Coefficient Standard Error 
P-
value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)   
      
Log employment 0.170 0.018 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors 0.036 0.225 0.872 
   More than 3 competitors -0.167 0.221 0.451 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.130 0.065 0.047 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.353 0.060 0.000 
   No change in sales 0.360 0.069 0.000 
Organizational change 0.333 0.024 0.000 
Pressure from Foreign Competitors 0.172 0.024 0.000 
Pressure from Customers 0.114 0.026 0.000 
Physical Infrastructure (principal component) -0.153 0.045 0.001 
Legal Infrastructure (principal component) -0.020 0.046 0.662 
Financial Infrastructure (principal component) 0.017 0.054 0.753 
State-Owned Firm -0.121 0.084 0.152 
New firm 0.236 0.064 0.000 
Industry 0.581 0.052 0.000 
Big City 0.056 0.052 0.283 
Country dummies YES    
N=3990, r2 (centered) =0.22 





Determinants of Sales Growth 
GMM estimation Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Error P-value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)    
      
Log employment growth 0.139 0.020 0.000 
Capital investment 0.503 0.036 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors -0.022 0.054 0.680 
   More than 3 competitors -0.052 0.053 0.333 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.029 0.019 0.126 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.022 0.017 0.204 
   No change in sales 0.037 0.019 0.052 
Innovation (principal component) 0.068 0.015 0.000 
Physical Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.004 0.013 0.738 
Legal Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.039 0.013 0.002 
Financial Infrastructure (principal 
component) 0.033 0.015 0.026 
State-Owned Firm -0.002 0.022 0.925 
New Firm -0.009 0.016 0.587 
Industry -0.016 0.017 0.327 
Big City 0.020 0.014 0.164 
Country dummies YES    
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions J-statistic = 0.748, p-value 0.69   
C-test for exogeneity of organizational change as instrument: 0.012, p-value 0.91   






Determinants of Innovation 
OLS Coefficient Standard Error 
P-
value 
  (bold=sig. @ 5%)   
      
Log employment 0.177 0.018 0.000 
Number of competitors 
   1-3 competitors 0.050 0.228 0.827 
   More than 3 competitors -0.165 0.224 0.461 
Market power (10% test) 
   Sales would fall a lot 0.139 0.065 0.033 
   Sales would fall slightly 0.362 0.060 0.000 
   No change in sales 0.370 0.069 0.000 
Change in General Manager -0.164 0.056 0.003 
Organizational change 0.341 0.024 0.000 
Pressure from Foreign Competitors 0.176 0.024 0.000 
Pressure from Customers 0.116 0.026 0.000 
Physical Infrastructure (principal component) -0.153 0.045 0.001 
Legal Infrastructure (principal component) -0.023 0.047 0.618 
Financial Infrastructure (principal component) 0.017 0.054 0.758 
State-Owned Firm -0.097 0.084 0.251 
New firm 0.222 0.064 0.001 
Industry 0.568 0.052 0.000 
Big City 0.046 0.052 0.379 
Country dummies YES    
N=3968, r2 (centered) =0.23 





Tables the showing construction of the principal components measures of innovation and 
infrastructure 
Table A1. Construction of innovation measure 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
1 0.43911     
    
      0.4683         0.4683 
2 0.14394     
    
 0.29516   0.1535         0.6219 
3 0.13512     
    
 0.00882  
   
0.1441         0.7660 
4 0.11574     
    
 0.01938  
   
0.1234         0.8894 
5 0.10368     
          
0.01206 0.1106         1.0000 
 
Survey question: Has your company undertaken any of 
the following initiatives in the last three years? 
 
Eigenvector of 1st component 
(weighting) 
Upgrading of existing product line 0.60601 
Successful development of major new product line 0.58474 
Introduction of new technology that substantially 
affected way main product produced 
0.47905 
Opening of new plant 0.18138 
Quality accreditation (ISO 9000) 0.16863 
 
 
Table A2. Construction of measure of physical infrastructure 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
1 0.35610     
    
 
0.3850         0.3850 
2 0.20088     
    
0.15522   
   
0.2172         0.6022 
3 0.11253     
    
0.08835   
   
0.1217         0.7238 
4 0.10100     
    
0.01153   
   
0.1092         0.8330 
5 0.08660     
    
0.01440   
   
0.0936         0.9266 
6 0.06787     
          
0.01873   
   
0.0734         1.0000 
 
Survey questions (all coded so poor quality, low access, 
problematic infrastructure is low): 
 
Eigenvector of 1st component 
(weighting) 
More than 3 days in 2001 with power outages / surges 0.65115 
More than 3 days in 2001 with water shortage  0.41626 
More than 3 days in 2001 with mainline telephone 
services unavailable  
0.39580 
In period since 1998, more than 3 days delay (after 
application) in getting a main-line telephone connection  
0.36071 
In period since 1998, more than 3 days delay (after 
application) in getting an electrical connection  
0.27677 
How problematic is electricity for the operation and 
growth of your business (1 no obstacle; 4 major) 
0.19838 
 
Table A3 Construction of measure of legal infrastructure 
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Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
1 0.35996     
    
 
0.6759         0.6759 
2 0.08397     
    
0.27599   
   
0.1577         0.8336 
3 0.05174     
    
0.03223   
   
0.0972         0.9307 
4 0.03688     
    
0.01486   
   
0.0693         1.0000 
 
Survey questions:  
 
Eigenvector of 1st component 
(weighting) 
How problematic is corruption for the operation and 
growth of your business (1 no obstacle; 4 major)    
0.55478 
How problematic is organized crime / mafia for the 
operation and growth of your business (1 no obstacle; 4 
major)   
 
0.50560 
How problematic is street crime /theft / disorder for 
the operation and growth of your business (1 no 
obstacle; 4 major)_Q80Cri |    
0.48428 
How problematic is the functioning of the judiciary for 
the operation and growth of your business (1 no 




Table A4 Construction of measure of financial infrastructure 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
1 0.23718     
    
 
0.8151         0.8151 
2 0.05379     
          
0.18339   
   
0.1849         1.0000 
 
Survey question:  
 
Eigenvector of 1st component 
(weighting) 
How problematic is access to finance (e.g. collateral 
required)or financing not available from banks for the 
operation and growth of your business (1 no obstacle; 4 
major)  
0.72415 
How problematic is cost of financing (e.g. interest 
rates and charges) for the operation and growth of your 
business (1 no obstacle; 4 major)  
0.68964 
 
 
 
 
